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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MERAMEC RIVER KILLING: STATE V. CROCKER AND
MISSOURI’S FIRST FORAY INTO THE NATIONAL DEBATE ON
SELF-DEFENSE

I. ALONG THE BANKS OF THE MERAMEC
Main Street in Steelville, Missouri, is home to the Crawford County
Courthouse of Missouri’s 42nd Judicial Circuit, a two-story brick structure
whose only architectural flair is some white gabling over a small portico
emblazoned “In God We Trust,” quotation marks included. Apart from the
typical courthouse lawn ornamentation of the national and state colors, a fivefoot marble veteran’s memorial, and a matching slab proclaiming the
building’s identity, the courthouse would be mistaken for a country chapel.
The octagonal gazebo set off from the front lawn seems almost excessive
against the modest backdrop of the courthouse.
One block east of the courthouse, past a few bail bondsmen and lawyers’
offices is Main Street’s lone watering hole, the West End Bar and Grill. The
place is dingy, its lighting supplied almost entirely by sunlight bouncing from
the street through two front windows, save for some additional blue glow from
a neon Busch beer sign and a flat screen television. On a usual day, the
bartender and two or three patrons will sit silently at the bar with their necks
craned upward at whatever generic crime drama happens to air. Occasionally,
they will look down to take a drag of a cigarette peeking from an ashtray or
poke through some cold fries left in the basket that used to contain a
cheeseburger. Nobody talks. The monotony of the scene is interrupted only by
random, garbled walkie-talkie exchanges from somewhere beneath the flat
screen. It is a police scanner. The exchanges between deputy and dispatcher
are unintelligible under the din of the TV shootout: a minor nuisance. Nobody
listens.
These scenes on Main Street are, in a word, typical.1
However, on July 20, 2013, around 1:30 p.m., just six miles from Main
Street, the scene turned anything but typical.2 Forty-eight-year-old Paul Dart
lay dead on a gravel bar along the Meramec River after a single nine

1. Although these scenes may seem a bit too typical and, as a result, fabricated for dramatic
effect, the author has tried to faithfully represent Steelville’s Main Street as he witnessed it in
October 2013.
2. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant at 2, State v. Crocker, No. 13CF-CR00772
(Mo. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2013).
1197

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1198

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1197

millimeter round fired by James Crocker struck Dart in the face.3 Minutes
before his death, Dart was paddling down the river in a rented canoe with
several friends, a summer ritual familiar to most Missourians.4 Dart and his
fellow floaters pulled ashore to grab a few drinks from the cooler and allow
one of them to urinate.5 Unfortunately, the party docked near Crocker’s
property,6 and the intrusion was not welcome.7 The unclear demarcation of
property lines along the river led to an argument between the floaters and
Crocker as to whether the gravel bar was “public.”8 When four members of the
party began advancing toward him, Crocker removed a pistol from the holster
on his side, firing two warning shots into the gravel.9 Crocker then aimed at the
man closest to him, the unarmed Dart, and shot him in the face.10 Before
departing the gravel bar, Crocker pointed his gun at another floater and asked,
“Do you want to be next? I have the power. You don’t.”11 The rocks along the
riverbank were laced with Dart’s blood.12 The river continued to flow slowly
and silently past the calamity.
This Note categorizes the Paul Dart killing as another episode in a national
debate over the justification of self-defense. To accomplish this, the Note first
examines the general history of self-defense law and the associated castle
doctrine (Part II). It then examines the recent history of Missouri’s current law
on the “[u]se of force in defense of persons” (Part III).13 Next, the Note relates
Missouri’s own expanded self-defense law to the more widely studied Stand
Your Ground law of Florida (Part IV).14 Finally, the Note critically reviews
3. Id.
4. Sam Levin, Cops: Homeowner Mad at Urinating Man on Meramec Float Trip Shoots,
Kills Paul Dart, RIVERFRONT TIMES (July 22, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/
dailyrft/2013/07/meramec_river_float_trip_murder_james_crocker.php. For a sense of its
familiarity to Missourians, see infra p. 1214.
5. Id.
6. Crocker’s property line was disputed during trial. See infra pp. 1214–15.
7. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Roche Madden, Wife of Man Gunned Down on Meramec River Speaks Out, FOX2NOW
ST. LOUIS (July 22, 2013), http://fox2now.com/2013/07/22/wife-of-man-gunned-down-on-floattrip-speaks-out/.
13. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2014).
14. The pathos, intrigue, and historical significance of the Michael Brown killing, unfolding
just 100 miles northeast of Steelville, exceeded that of the Trayvon Martin killing. However, this
Note analyzes the Florida killing in depth while largely ignoring (as much as the Saint Louis
author can bear) the Ferguson killing for the following reasons. First, the Trayvon Martin killing
morphed the national debate on self-defense—as wedded to issues of class, race, gun ownership,
and the American propensity for violence—into the form that existed at the time of the Paul Dart
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Missouri’s expanded self-defense law (Part V) based on the dilemmas caused
by the inequities in the application of such expanded protections (Subsection
A), faulty statutory construction (Subsection B), and historical conflicts
inherent in the justification of self-defense that are exacerbated by the statute
(Subsection C). The outcome of James Crocker’s trial (Part VI) is related prior
to the Note’s conclusion (Part VII). This analysis of Missouri’s expanded
castle doctrine codified in section 563.031 will reveal that the statute and its
problems are not unique; it is simply another iteration of a counterproductive
statute founded upon the special interests of gun owners and a
misconceptualization of American values.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW JUSTIFICATION OF SELF-DEFENSE
Fortunately, this shooting on the Meramec River is not as typical for
Missouri as the afternoon ennui of the West End Bar and Grill, but the shots
fired by James Crocker are not a minor nuisance or to be dismissed as an
anomaly. The tragedy, like so many others populating national headlines over
the past few years,15 fits into a larger, historical debate on the tendency of the
justification of self-defense to promote violence through vigilante action.16
The justification of self-defense exists “to compensate for the limitations
of a written code . . . [and] to provide an exculpating exception for acts that are
prohibited by the written code but nonetheless are proper because of justifying
circumstances not accounted for in it.”17 However, like much of American
criminal law, the current self-defense doctrine “remains grounded in largely
obsolete nineteenth-century notions of free will and individualism.”18
Historically, self-defense as a justification is seen as “morally appropriate,”
unlike defenses of excuse, which are simply “not blameworthy.”19
killing. Second, the Trayvon Martin killing, like the Paul Dart killing, involved civilian-oncivilian violence and thus avoids the swirling themes of police militarization and systematic state
antagonism of minority populations. Third, Ferguson is still playing out through municipal court
reform, and the already complex event remains difficult to place in historical perspective.
15. Lizette Alvarez, Jury Reaches Partial Verdict in Florida Killing over Loud Music, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, at A20; Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in
Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1; Monica Davey, Shooting of Black
Woman Stirs Racial Tensions Around Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at A11.
16. The vigilante actions in all of these cases have been particularly troubling because all the
defendants are white and all the victims are black. Alvarez, supra note 15.
17. Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for
Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 272 (1975).
18. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward
Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
303, 328 (1992).
19. Id. at 305–06 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 91 (1986)).
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At common law, a defender is justified in using force to repel an attack
within certain limitations. The defender must reasonably believe that force is
immediately necessary to repel a threat, and the force used must be
proportional to the threat posed.20 In addition, a defender is not justified in
using force to repel an attack if he or she may safely retreat from that attack.21
This final limitation became known as the “Retreat Rule.”22 However, the
common law maxim that a man’s home is his castle also gave rise to an
exception to this duty to retreat, embracing the notion “that retreating to the
home was, essentially, retreating to the wall.”23 Whether through application of
the castle doctrine or some other mechanism, American jurisdictions began
carving out “no retreat” exceptions to the common law rule as early as the
nineteenth century.24 However, under the castle doctrine, all other self-defense
requirements involving the reasonableness and proportionality of the use of
force remained in effect.25 Proportionality is founded on the rationale that it
“protect[s] the legal order” and is applied in a number of international
jurisdictions.26
Many states began eliminating these common law requirements, such as
the duty to retreat, from the justification of self-defense through legislative
action in the mid-2000s.27 By 2013, a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States had adopted “Shoot First” statutes, permitting the use of deadly force in
public places where there previously was a duty to retreat at common law.28
III. MISSOURI’S DIVERGENCE FROM THE COMMON LAW
One statute29 that is more permissive of the use of deadly force than the
common law doctrine of self-defense is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine
20. 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th ed. 2014).
21. See id.
22. Epps, supra note 18, at 305.
23. Sarah A. Pohlman, Comment, Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to
Defense of Habitation, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 860 (2012).
24. Epps, supra note 18, at 307.
25. Pohlman, supra note 23.
26. Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggressor’s
Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 893 (2004).
27. P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle
Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground,
35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2007).
28. “Stand Your Ground” Policy Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE
(July 18, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/shoot-first-laws-policy-summary/.
29. And, it appears that there are other statutes poised to join it. See Marie French, Missouri
House Approves Extension of ‘Castle Doctrine’ to Guests, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 24,
2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-house-approvesextension-of-castle-doctrine-to-guests/article_b5c62eb8-9443-5bf5-a0cd-ec2ebd8eaef6.html. Of
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found in Missouri Revised Statute section 563.031.30 That section eliminates
any duty to retreat from private property owned by the defender and allows the
use of deadly force on private property owned by the defender in situations
where only non-deadly force would be permitted otherwise.31 Although that
self-defense statute qualifies as an expanded castle doctrine—broadening the
application of the doctrine from the dwelling to any real property owned by the
defender32—the spirit of the law resembles the Stand Your Ground laws that
became the center of debate in the wake of the Trayvon Martin shooting.33
Further, both Missouri and Florida’s self-defense statutes implicate the even
more polarizing issue regarding the right to possess and use firearms.34
Missouri case law largely followed the common law justification of selfdefense throughout the twentieth century.35 In the 1980 decision of State v.
Ivicsics, the Eastern District Court of Appeals held that defense of habitation
was merely an “accelerated” form of self-defense.36 The court set forth the
following test for the use of deadly force in defense of habitation:
The defense of habitation grants the lawful occupant of a dwelling the
privilege to use deadly force to prevent an attempted unlawful entry into the
dwelling, if the occupant had reasonable cause to believe that (1) there is
immediate danger the entry will occur, (2) the entry is being attempted for the
purpose of killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on the occupant and (3)
37
deadly force is necessary to prevent the unlawful entry.

The privilege to use deadly force was, therefore, accelerated because the
deadly force could be used to repel an attacker’s unlawful entry to the
defender’s home prior to the anticipated attack. However, this brand of defense
of premises was not much of a departure from established self-defense
doctrine, because the defender would still be required to show a reasonable
belief that the entry was intended for the purpose of killing or inflicting serious
course, statutes like Missouri Revised Statute section 563.046 (permitting law enforcement use of
deadly force to effect the arrest of a felon) have been in the books for some time. See John Simon,
Tennessee v. Garner: The Fleeing Felon Rule, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1259, 1266 n.46 (1986).
30. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 857.
31. Id. at 858.
32. Id. at 857–58.
33. Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law,
23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 272 (2012).
34. The Speaker Pro Tem made this implication unavoidable when, in his September 12,
2007, address to the Missouri House of Representatives, he exclaimed, “We passed the conceal
and carry bill and the castle doctrine—We respect Missourians’ gun rights!” H. JOURNAL, 94th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., at 5 (2007).
35. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 869.
36. State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
37. Id.
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bodily harm.38 The defender’s presence in his or her dwelling did not
fundamentally alter the nature of the justification of self-defense.39
The fundamental change occurred with the state legislature’s 2007 and
2010 amendments to the Revised Missouri Statutes’ section 563.031.40 In
2007, “defense of habitation and self-defense officially merged into one
statute . . . [creating] a new defense of habitation provision within the preexisting self-defense statute.”41 The pertinent parts of the statute read:
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she
reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a
third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent
use of unlawful force by such other person, unless:
(1) The actor was the initial aggressor . . . .
2. A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to protect
himself or herself or another against death, serious physical injury, or any
forcible felony; or
(2) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter a dwelling, residence, or
vehicle lawfully occupied by such person.
3. A person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or
42
vehicle where the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining.

The 2007 amendment effectively extended the privilege to use deadly
force not only in situations involving unlawful entry for the purpose of causing
serious bodily harm, but also in situations where that unlawful entry has
already been completed.43 This amendment specifically responded to the 2006
decision in State v. Goodine,44 where the court held that “once the intruder
enters the premises without resistance, the defender is no longer entitled to an
instruction on defense of premises.”45 With the 2007 amendment, the
legislature specifically allowed the justification of defense of premises for the

38. Id.
39. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 869–70.
40. Id. at 871, 879.
41. Id. at 875.
42. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2007) (emphasis added).
43. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 875–76.
44. 196 S.W.3d 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Robert H. Dierker, Defense of Premises—“Castle
Doctrine,” 32 MO. PRAC., MO. CRIM. LAW § 9.4 n.12 (2d ed.).
45. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d at 613.
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use of deadly force.46 But, the legislature quietly went a step further in
expanding the justifiable use of deadly force by effectively removing the
proportionality requirement from the defense of premises.47 “Now . . . simple
unlawful force will justify a response of deadly force if the person using
unlawful force is also trespassing.”48
The legislature did not stop with the 2007 amendment. The 2010
amendment to section 563.031 again extended the justifiable use of deadly
force under defense of premises by broadening the definition of premises and
explicitly eliminating the duty to retreat from any premises owned by the
defender.49 The statute now includes the following:
2. A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless: . . .
(3) Such force is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after
unlawfully entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is
owned or leased by an individual claiming a justification of using protective
force under this section.
3. A person does not have a duty to retreat from a dwelling, residence, or
vehicle where the person is not unlawfully entering or unlawfully remaining. A
person does not have a duty to retreat from private property that is owned or
50
leased by such individual.

Just to make the expansion of the justifiable use of deadly force abundantly
clear, the legislature provided the following definition in 563.011: “(6) ‘Private
property’, any real property in this state that is privately owned or leased.”51
Now, defense of habitation is extended all the way to a homeowner’s property
line despite the courts’ previous refusal to extend defense of habitation beyond
even the curtilage of a home.52
IV. MISSOURI’S EXPANDED CASTLE DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO STAND YOUR
GROUND
The elimination of the duty to retreat from as broad of an area as “any real
property”53 resembles the general elimination of the duty to retreat in other

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

§ 563.031(2).
Id.
Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879.
MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2010).
Id.
§ 563.011(6).
Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879.
§ 563.011(6).
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states’ Stand Your Ground laws.54 On October 26, 2005, Florida enacted the
infamous Stand Your Ground law that “radically expanded Florida’s selfdefense law, even insulating shooters from criminal prosecution and civil
suit.”55 Before that law, a defender was required to show a reasonable belief
that the use of force was “necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of
a forcible felony.”56 He or she had a duty to retreat if he could do so in
absolute safety.57 Stand Your Ground removed that duty, allowing defenders to
“stand their ground and meet force with force.”58
Under Florida’s Stand Your Ground law, self-defense is no longer an
affirmative defense that can only be adjudicated at trial.59 Stand Your Ground
shifts the burden to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defender was not acting in self-defense and creates a presumption that a person
possessed a reasonable fear of “imminent peril of death or great bodily harm”
if “[t]he person against whom . . . force was used was in the process of
unlawfully and forcefully entering, [or had already entered], a ‘dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle.’”60 Defenders also have the right to a pre-trial
hearing where, if the preponderance of the evidence shows that they acted
lawfully pursuant to Stand Your Ground, they can be immunized from future
prosecution or civil suit.61 The increased privilege to use deadly force to repel
an unlawful entry or completed entry of a “dwelling, residence, or occupied
vehicle” is obvious in both Florida’s and Missouri’s statutes.62
Although George Zimmerman raised only a traditional self-defense claim
in his trial for shooting and killing Trayvon Martin, the case begged the
question: “Are Floridians too quick to use deadly force?”63 Public outcry also
implicitly questioned whether that state’s Stand Your Ground law was
“appropriate and adequate to keep Floridians safe from future tragedies.”64
Zimmerman claimed not to be familiar with the Stand Your Ground law during
54. Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2013).
55. Id. at 832.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 832–33.
59. Lave, supra note 54, at 834–35.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 835.
62. Compare id. at 834–35 and MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2010).
63. Lawson, supra note 33, at 299.
64. Id. Because Stand Your Ground laws grant individuals expansive privileges to use
handguns against others when they perceive a threat, these laws levy “a high cost, as sometimes
the gun owner is wrong in his or her assessment of the existence of a threat and/or its seriousness,
and a victim’s life is lost needlessly.” Id. at 300.
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his trial, but the law was brought to the jury’s attention nonetheless when a
former professor testified that Zimmerman had “actually been taught about the
law before the shooting took place.”65 This leads to speculation that
Zimmerman either lied or, even if not consciously familiar with the law,
somehow internalized that knowledge, which incentivized his decision to
follow Martin despite the 911 dispatcher’s admonition not to do so.66 Whether
or not the Stand Your Ground law directly resulted in the violence that claimed
Martin’s life, Zimmerman’s highly publicized acquittal certainly sends a
message to prospective vigilantes across the country that such violence is
justified.67
A similar dilemma arose in the 2013 killing of Paul Dart. There is no way
to know if James Crocker was truly aware of the applicability of Missouri’s
expanded castle doctrine or if that awareness encouraged his decision to shoot
Dart. However, Crocker’s reported statements that “it’s my property, and I was
going to protect it” and “I have the power”68 seem to beg the same questions
that arose from the Trayvon Martin killing: Are Americans too quick to use
deadly force?69 Is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine appropriate and
adequate to keep Missourians safe from future tragedies?
However, unlike the Trayvon Martin trial that only obliquely referred to
the Stand Your Ground law,70 the Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine became
an important issue in the trial of James Crocker.71 If the gravel bar where Paul
Dart died was on Crocker’s property, defense of premises would apply where it
would not have prior to 2010.72 The use of force in the defense of premises
would not have been available to Crocker to defend against an intrusion onto
his real property until the amendments to 563.031.73 If the legislature had not
pre-empted State v. Goodine, use of force in defense of premises would not

65. Lave, supra note 54, at 853.
66. Id. at 853–54.
67. If the reader doubts that this message could be taken away from the Florida tragedy,
recall Zimmerman’s fandom that gifted him a fortune for his artwork. Vivian Kuo, Bids for
George Zimmerman Artwork Top $100,000, CNN.COM (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:13 A.M.),
http://www.cnn. com/2013/12/17/us/george-zimmerman-ebay-painting.
68. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2.
69. This is certainly a valid question, considering that homicides rates were as much as
seven times that of other industrialized nations from 1950 to 2000. Gary LaFree & Andromachi
Tseloni, Democracy and Crime: A Multilevel Analysis of Homicide Trends in Forty-Four
Countries, 1950-2000, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 26, 34–35 (2006).
70. Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Studied ‘Stand Your Ground’ in Class, Florida Court Is Told,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A15.
71. More accurately, it became an issue important for the state to avoid. See infra pp. 1216–
17.
72. See Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879.
73. Id.
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have been available to Crocker because any unlawful entry to his real property
would have been completed.74 The 2007 amendment to section 563.031,
further eliminating the proportionality requirement in situations of unlawful
entry of premises owned by the defender,75 also would allow Crocker to argue
that his use of deadly force was justified based on his reasonable belief that the
intruding floaters intended to use any amount of force against him.76
According to Crocker’s statements to investigators, “four male subjects . . .
began advancing toward him, [and] one of the males had two rocks in his
hands.”77 In interviews provided by Dart’s wife, there is some suggestion that
Dart grabbed for Crocker’s gun: “He went to the guy’s arm to try to stop
him.”78 Crocker could argue that all of these factors substantiate his fear of an
attack and that such an attack justifies his use of deadly force under section
563.031. On the other hand, Crocker could invoke the general justification of
self-defense, but there would be no reason not to pursue a defense under
section 563.031 given its elimination of the common law proportionality
requirement.79
Although reports in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and Riverfront Times
never delved into editorialism, the tenor of the coverage is that the Dart killing
was a senseless act by a crazed property-owner taking some backwards sense
of justice to a horrifying extreme.80 The vacant stare and unkempt hair of
Crocker’s mugshot that accompanies every article do little to paint Crocker as
a sympathetic character.81 But, just as every hour of the Trayvon Martin trial
exposed the prosecution’s case as increasingly thin—and talk show pundits
slowly began uttering the word “acquittal” without any real exasperation82—

74. State v. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
75. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 878–79.
76. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.011 (2010).
77. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2.
78. Kim Bell, Meramec Float Trip Ends in Fatal Shooting After Dispute over Property
Rights Along Waterway, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 23, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/meramec-float-trip-ends-in-fatal-shooting-after-dispute-over/article_
a2774d0e-578c-5d01-89e2-d334dbe7c9c3.html.
79. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879.
80. See Bell, supra note 78; Sam Levin, James Crocker: Evidence Shows Float Trip Shooter
Was Attacked, Injured, Says Lawyer, RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2013/08/james_crocker_paul_dart_float_trip_shooting_
trial.php.
81. See Bell, supra note 78; Levin, supra note 80.
82. Erin Donaghue, George Zimmerman Verdict: Prosecutors “Didn’t Have the Evidence”
to Prove Their Case, Experts Say, CBSNEWS.COM (July 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbs
news.com/news/george-zimmerman-verdict-prosecutors-didnt-have-the-evidence-to-prove-theircase-experts-say/.
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the real monster in the Dart killing could be made not of the shooter, but the
law that emboldened him.
Of course, the Dart killing also lacks the racially charged storyline that
may have ultimately doomed the story to merely regional significance.83
However, this absent element makes the Dart killing more about the failings of
the law rather than the prejudices of the actors involved. The protections of the
expanded castle doctrine, which can obviously only apply to owners or lessees,
raise the same issues of class discrimination that have been suggested in the
Stand Your Ground debate.84 In Missouri, two propositions should be
considered: (1) the extent of one’s privilege to use deadly force is directly
related to the amount of real property that person owns or leases; (2) deadly
force used in defense of premises is most likely to be used on those who own
or lease smaller properties. This second proposition is especially true in the
context of the float trip, in which Dart was participating at the time of his
death. Although Dart was forty-eight years old, floaters are usually younger
people who, as a result, lease smaller real property.85 Further, floaters are most
likely to come into contact with property owners asserting their expanded right
to defense of premises because floaters make use of public waterways cutting
directly through, or adjacent to, private property.86 Thus, in addition to the two
primary questions posed above,87 a third question is added to the debate:
Whose interests motivate Missouri’s lawmakers?
V. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SECTION 563.031
A.

Partisan Legislation Catering to Special Interests

With this discussion of who ultimately benefits from the expanded castle
doctrine, it is helpful to understand how the bills were pushed through the
legislative process. Stand Your Ground laws were first conceived in a “flurry
of national legislative activity” in 2005, a time when violent crime was,
nationally, on the decline.88 That activity was backed primarily by the National

83. Dart was a forty-eight-year-old white male, and Crocker is a fifty-nine-year-old white
male. See Bell, supra note 78.
84. Lave, supra note 54, at 850–51.
85. This is an observation based on the author’s repeated participation in float trips from
2003 to 2014.
86. See Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17, 20, 26 (Mo. 1954) (recognizing a public easement
allowing the use of canoes on the Meramec River even though the waterway was considered nonnavigable).
87. Are Americans too quick to use deadly force? Is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine
appropriate and adequate to keep Missourians safe from future tragedies? See supra pp. 1205.
88. Ross, supra note 27, at 16–17.
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Rifle Association (NRA).89 Likewise, Missouri’s subsequent amendments
enjoyed the full support of the NRA, with the organization’s executive director
Chris Cox joining Governor Matt Blunt for the signing of Senate Bill 62 (the
2007 amendment).90 Cox made no attempt to veil the significance of the
amendment to the NRA’s grand agenda of expanding gun rights: “Missourians
are fortunate to have a Governor and state legislators who respect and cherish
their Second Amendment rights.”91
With bills like S.B. 62, it is no wonder that the legislative process is often
cynically compared to sausage-making. The only thing wrong with the
sausage-making analogy in the case of section 563.031 is that nothing
palatable was produced by the grotesquery of the legislative process. While
Second Amendment proponents painted Stand Your Ground or castle doctrine
legislation as safeguarding fundamental rights, critics immediately warned
against a disproportionate, negative impact on racial minorities: “These laws
are passed to protect the law-abiding people from criminals, . . . [y]et innocent
people may end up being killed because of the new laws, while nothing will
happen to the killers.”92 These fears, unfortunately, seem to have been
vindicated by the actions of George Zimmerman, Theodore Wafer, and
Michael Dunn.93
Again, on the surface, the racial component is lacking from the Dart
killing—the violence was not cross-racial.94 However, the treatment of the
shooting by law enforcement and the media may point to a dormant form of
racial discrimination. The media readily dismissed Crocker as a gun-toting
psychopath. One dismissive report proclaimed, “James Crocker Cannot Claim
‘Castle Doctrine’ in Shooting Along Meramec River, Says Sheriff,” only days
after the shooting.95 This revelation seems to be based primarily on Sheriff
Randy Martin’s statement that “[w]e don’t know where the property owners
[sic] land begins and ends,” as Sheriff Martin is never quoted to confirm
explicitly that the castle doctrine does not apply.96 Essentially, the report
dismisses Crocker’s defense on the conjecture that the shooting occurred

89. Id. at 17.
90. Missouri Governor Signs Castle Doctrine, Hunting Preservation Bills into Law, NAT’L
RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 6, 2007), http://www.nraila.org/hunting/issues-andalerts/2007/missouri-governor-signs-castle-doctrine.aspx?s=missouri+governor+signs&st=&ps=.
91. Id.
92. Ross, supra note 27, at 45.
93. See supra text accompanying note 14.
94. See Bell, supra note 78.
95. Farrah Fazal, James Crocker Cannot Claim ‘Castle Doctrine’ in Shooting Along
Meramec River, Says Sheriff, KSDK.COM (July 22, 2013), http://www.ksdk.com/news/article/38
9366/3/Sheriff-Castle-Law-does-not-apply-in-shooting-along-Meramec-River.
96. Id.
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beyond his property line. This creates a new dilemma: Would this particular
report afford Crocker the protection of the castle doctrine if the shooting victim
had been black? Or even more troubling: Can the justice system (through
prosecutorial discretion or juror bias) choose when to apply the castle doctrine
based upon the victim’s identity? A guilty verdict in Crocker’s trial, juxtaposed
with the outcomes of the Zimmerman and Dunn cases,97 may suggest that
Crocker’s jurors, as proxy for the white majority of Americans, can accept the
occasional loss of life resulting from the expanded castle doctrine, as long as
that life is not of the same color as them.
B.

The Problematic Construction of Section 563.031

Sheriff Martin’s comment about the unclear demarcation of Crocker’s
property line raises another issue with, specifically, the 2010 amendment to
section 563.031: Does the applicability of the statute now depend on
something as esoteric to the layperson as riparian rights based upon the
navigability of a watercourse? If so, does the statute attempt to provide
uniformity in a place better suited for case-by-case determinations?
Conceptually, the 2010 amendment makes little sense. If Crocker is not
entitled to the protection of the castle doctrine on the gravel bar where he shot
Dart, would he receive the protection fifteen feet farther into the woods? What
about fifty feet? Attributing varying levels of sanctity for any given outdoor
location, based upon the content of a legal title, is simply too far afield from
the philosophical underpinnings of the common law castle doctrine.98 The
legislature likely had visions of a Goodine-style front yard melee when it
extended the castle doctrine,99 but extending the doctrine to any real property is
unreasonably broad—especially when any sanctity of the front yard could have
been protected by using a word like curtilage.100 Again, Missouri’s castle
doctrine has become so expansive that it is conceptually closer to a general
Stand Your Ground statute. When viewed in this context, it is no wonder that
the NRA considered the passage of the section 563.031 amendments such a
momentous victory for Second Amendment rights.101
Another indicator that the statute was ill-conceived is simply its
manufactured necessity. By conflating defense of premises (found in
97. Zimmerman was acquitted, and the Dunn jury failed to reach a verdict on the seconddegree murder count. Alvarez, supra note 15; Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 15.
98. Pohlman, supra note 23.
99. State v. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d 607, 610–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
100. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 879.
101. Missouri Governor Signs Important Pro-Gun Measures into Law, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’NINST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 14, 2010), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/
2010/7/missouri-governor-signs-important-pro-g.aspx?s=pro-gun%%2020measures&st=%20104
89&ps=.
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subsection 2) and a now absurdly expanded castle doctrine (found in
subsection 3), the statute has displaced an established line of cases that kept the
two doctrines independent, both with clear, well-reasoned limits on their
application.102 As mentioned earlier, cases like Goodine may have limited the
application of defense of habitation,103 but the legislature’s response was just
as disproportionate as a nine-millimeter round answering a thrown rock.
Aside from the fatal consequences of the amendments, Sarah Pohlman
lucidly criticized the newly convoluted language of section 563.031 in her
article Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to Defense of
Habitation.104 Pohlman pointed out that it could at least be argued that the
added subsection 2, which states:
A person may not use deadly force upon another person under the
circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless . . . [s]uch force
is used against a person who unlawfully enters, remains after unlawfully
entering, or attempts to unlawfully enter private property that is owned or
leased by an individual claiming a justification of using protective force under
105
this section[,]

did not “incorporate subsection 1’s requirements of reasonable belief,
necessity, and imminent harm.”106 Although Pohlman ultimately believed the
alternative interpretation of the statute, that subsection 2 did indeed incorporate
the requirement of subsection 1,107 the statutory language was unnecessarily
muddled and then substituted for clear case law.108 This was a second
indication that the amendments were ramrodded through the legislature,
without meaningful reflection, at the behest of the NRA.109
Even with subsection 2’s incorporation of subsection 1, Missouri courts
are left to sort out what is now “an extreme divergence from the
proportionality element” that existed prior to the amendments.110 With the

102. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 869–70.
103. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d at 613.
104. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 881–82.
105. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2 (2010).
106. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 877.
107. Id. at 877–78.
108. The Western District Court of Appeals agreed and disagreed with Pohlman in State v.
Clinch, 335 S.W.3d 579, 587–88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). In dicta, the court noted that while
subsection 2 did not “eliminate the requirement of [imminence found in subsection 1, it] . . .
codified that the unlawful entry into a dwelling, residence, or vehicle constitutes the act of force
necessary to justify deadly force.” Id. at 588. Thus, in defense of premises cases, the imminence
requirement of subsection 1 is so fundamentally altered that subsection 1 is not really
incorporated by subsection 2 at all.
109. See Missouri Governor Signs Important Pro-Gun Measures into Law, supra note 101.
110. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 878.
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amendments, if a defender anticipates any use of unlawful force, a response of
deadly force is justified if the attacker is also trespassing.111 If section 563.031
was put to the jury in the Crocker case, Crocker’s defense would have
depended on evidence that the floaters were approaching him with rocks. Did
the legislature seriously contemplate that a bullet would be an appropriate
response to a rock? The problem with any expanded self-defense statute and
concomitant reaffirmation of Second Amendment rights is that proportionality
becomes increasingly harder to find when the destructive power of firearms
enters the picture.112 Proportionality is essential to self-defense’s existence as a
justification and to its role in protecting the populace.113 Thus, the legislature
should seriously consider whether the fundamental social goals of self-defense
could be achieved when legislation expanding the doctrine is wedded to the
proliferation of gun ownership.114
C. Historical Conflicts Inherent in the Justification of Self-Defense
The reality is that the conflicts resulting from Missouri’s expanded castle
doctrine are simply the latest iterations of tensions that have always existed in
self-defense law. While the tension in the Dart killing was above characterized
as floaters versus landowners, that tension can be further reduced, at the risk of
oversimplification, to urban versus rural ideologies.115 Those competing
ideologies underscore an even greater identity crisis at the core of American
politics. In fact, the first principal question posed above—are Americans too
quick to use deadly force?—is simply a sub-question of a broader question of
American identity: Who are we and what kind of country do we want to make
for ourselves?
On the side of more restrictive self-defense justification are urbanites, who
are generally “egalitarian . . . solidaristic . . . [and] ‘logically opposed to
individualism.’”116 “Urban individuals see gun possession as a threat to their
sense of community.”117 Naturally, self-defense, with an emphasis on self,
champions the ideal of individualism.118 The logical link between self-defense

111. Id. at 879.
112. The percentage of homicides resulting from firearm use hovered around 70% for most of
the twentieth century. See Lance K. Stell, The Production of Criminal Violence in America: Is
Strict Gun Control the Solution?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 40 (2004).
113. Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 26.
114. H. JOURNAL, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., at 7 (Mo. 2007).
115. Christopher T. Pierce, Not Only in My Backyard but on My Front Stoop: The Forgotten
Opinion of Urbanites About Concealed-Carry in Missouri, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 414–
25 (2006).
116. Id. at 421.
117. Id. at 422.
118. Epps, supra note 18.
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and this rural sense of individualism is all too apparent in expansions of selfdefense law. Rural individuals are more likely to live in areas isolated from
law enforcement, and self-help may present the only option available for
preservation of life or property. Fittingly, the expanded castle doctrine was
born of this rural milieu; Senate Bill 62 was sponsored by a state senator from
Mount Vernon, Missouri.119
In a sense, Missouri is the perfect powder keg for urban-rural conflict
because it possesses two major urban centers (Kansas City and Saint Louis)
that bracket over one hundred largely rural counties (perhaps with the
exception of Boone County, which possesses the University of MissouriColumbia). The ideological divide is clearly depicted in the 2012 general
election results—presidential candidate Barack Obama emerged victorious in
only four counties but won a whopping 82.7% of the vote in Saint Louis
City.120 In 2014, the state has a Democratic governor but a House of
Representatives controlled by Republicans.121 The demographic dichotomy
existing in Missouri further complicates the second principal question posed
above—Is Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine appropriate and adequate to
keep Missourians safe from future tragedies?—because it could lead to the
unsatisfying answer of some Missourians, but not others. In response to this
equivocation, we could allow the legislative process to keep churning out
artificial codifications of whatever behaviors are ostensibly deemed acceptable
by the majority of the population.122 The other option is to grapple with our
identity crisis so that we can definitively answer whether expanded selfdefense statutes really help fashion the world we want for ourselves.123

119. Missouri Governor Traveling the State and Signing Important Pro-Gun Legislation!,
NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N-INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (July 2, 2007), https://www.nraila.org/articles/200
70702/missouri-governor-traveling-the-state-a.
120. 2012 Missouri Presidential Results, POLITICO.COM (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.politi
co.com/2012-election/results/president/missouri/.
121. State of Missouri—General Election—November 6, 2012 Official Results, MO.
SECRETARY ST.—ELECTIONS & VOTING (Dec. 5, 2012), http://enr.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/default.
aspx?eid=750002497.
122. But see Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 947–
58 (2014) (scrutinizing whether our system of geographic representation really expresses the will
of the people).
123. It is important to remember the role of conflicting urban and rural sensibilities even in
Saint Louis’s current decidedly urban morass. That conflict is not the defining factor of the
culture of violence gripping American cities, however, because there is no one defining factor. To
reduce the events following the death of Michael Brown to any one issue (police militarization,
structural racism, or even misguided self-defense legislation) neglects the complexity of the world
that we already have fashioned for ourselves, which involved many missteps over many years.
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VI. THE REALITY OF TRIAL
On May 12, 2014, James Crocker’s trial commences at the Crawford
County Courthouse. Seemingly every sheriff’s deputy in the county finds a
post to man at the chapel-courthouse. At 8:30 a.m., three deputies guard the
front door to vet the lone observer.124 The clerk’s office has blocked cause
number 13CF-CR00772 on Case.net—Missouri’s online case information
system—and the court’s administrative assistant refuses to provide any
information regarding the trial schedule over the telephone. The tensions
between the victim’s family and defendant’s supporters are less of a reason and
more of an excuse for the heightened security. The rumored presence of one
cub reporter from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch is enough temptation for the men
and women in beige to flex.125 The courtroom is typical as far as the climate
and primary building material are concerned: nearly freezing and lacquered
wood. However, the benches in the gallery, constructed from wrought iron and
wood slats, look more suited to the gazebo outside. The bar is similarly
constructed from fence-like wrought iron. The bench, tucked into the corner
opposite the doorway, is only a foot or two raised from the well. Behind that, a
dry wall partition separates the courtroom from the judge’s chambers but does
little to soundproof the conversations that occur in camera.
The voir dire process is scheduled to begin around 9:00 a.m., but the
prosecutor and the court are still resolving pretrial motions. Crocker sits alone
at the defendant’s table, blankly staring forward with his hands clasped in front
of him. His face, still goateed, is even more drawn than the mugshots that
surfaced nearly a year earlier. Everything about Crocker is drab: his blue jeans
(concealing leg braces), slate collared shirt (tucked in but with no tie), and gray
mane (combed back tightly before curling just below his shoulders). The
Honorable Kelly Parker sits at the bench, unrobed for the pretrial motions but
dressed sharply. The angles of his suit match his cropped hair and rectangular
frames of his glasses. His rulings are deliberately paced with a slight country

124. The lone observer is the author because Judge Kelly Parker prohibited the media from
attending voir dire.
125. As it turns out, Jesse Bogan’s coverage of the trial is fantastic. Listed chronologically:
Jesse Bogan, Trial Set to Begin in Meramec Float Trip Killing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May
13, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/trial-set-to-begin-in-meramecfloat-trip-killing/article_e400b956-45fe-522b-828d-02457b22f49b.html; Jesse Bogan, Lawyer
Says Gunman in Fatal Meramec River Shooting Acted in Self-Defense, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (May 14, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/lawyer-saysgunman-in-fatal-meramec-river-shooting-acted-in/article_5d74d474-04fe-5cca-b6b1-cd04096715
82.html; Jesse Bogan, Man Gets 25 Years in Shooting Death of Meramec River Floater, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 15, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
man-gets-years-in-shooting-death-of-meramec-river-floater/article_4e9657d1-3691-529e-a05a-9
8c3bee421c3.html.
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drawl. Prosecutor William Seay, a former judge, speaks at the same modest
rate but commands the bellowing voice of a fire and brimstone preacher. Seay
is heavy, stern-faced, reclining comfortably in a leather chair bearing his name,
and coolly rotating some manner of precious stone about his ring finger.
Assistant prosecutor Michael Randazzo is seated to Seay’s left. He is the
youngest of the players in the trial, and his facial features seem almost delicate
next to the Churchill-esque Seay. Randazzo’s juvenile appearance is
exaggerated by, despite his healthy frame, a slightly wide suit jacket.
Crocker’s attorney, Michael Bert, arrives from Saint Louis shortly before
Judge Parker’s final pretrial ruling. The unusually muggy morning has gotten a
hold of him. His breathing is heavy, and his wavy hair looks slick with sweat.
Perhaps exasperated by the heat, the I-44 traffic, or the unfavorable pretrial
rulings, Bert quickly eclipses Seay and Judge Parker in words per minute. The
one hundred and sixty potential jurors remain in limbo at the associate court
across the street while Seay, Bert, and Judge Parker retire to (not-so-secret)
chambers to clear up last minute concerns.
By late morning, Judge Parker, now robed, stands stately in the middle of
the courtroom to finally greet the potential jurors. The voir dire for the first one
hundred potential jurors proceeds predictably: Seay never breaks character as
the courtroom’s consummate pro, and Bert ingratiates himself to the jury’s
rural sensibilities to quash the perception that he is the outsider. The
homogeneity of the jury pool is also predictable, almost comically so. One
potential juror appears to be Southeast Asian; the rest are white. Over half of
the potential jurors own or have access to guns in their homes. Only ten
potential jurors have never floated. Every potential juror has heard or read
about the Paul Dart killing. The remainder of the first day of trial is spent
empaneling the jury. The final jury composition is as follows: nine men, two
women, all white, and all but one appear older than forty.
The state opens its case on the second day of trial with testimony from
members of Dart’s float party, fleshing out the story told in the charging
documents.126
On the third day of trial, the state presents the evidence relevant to the
statute at the center of this Note. With Kim Cook, the Recorder of Deeds, on
the stand, the court admits a warranty deed granting Crocker Lot Seven of
Meramec Estates in the mid-2000s. The County Surveyor, Mark Mueller,
testifies as to the location of physical evidence in relation to the property line
of Lot Seven. Mueller testifies that the previous survey of Meramec Estates,
completed by his father in 1970, marked the northwestern boundary of Lot
Seven at north 33 degrees, 26 minutes, 11 seconds east. This was
126. Bogan, Lawyer Says Gunman in Fatal Meramec River Shooting Acted in Self-Defense,
supra note 125.
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approximately the eastern bank of the Meramec River’s “old channel” in 1970.
The shell casings and blood pool lay fifty feet east from the 2013 water line but
381 feet west from this 1970 boundary of Lot Seven. The court admits
Mueller’s survey of the crime scene. The County Assessor, Kerry Summers,
then testifies that the landowners across the river from Crocker are Philip and
Helen Hughes and that their property reaches southwest to north 33 degrees, 26
minutes, 11 seconds. The upshot of all this is that Crocker shot Paul Dart
almost 400 feet from Crocker’s property, and the state appears to succeed in
taking Missouri’s expanded castle doctrine out of play.
Crocker takes the stand to maintain his belief that he owned property to the
Meramec River. He has little support for this proposition, however, other than
supposed representations made by Lot Seven’s previous owner and some
vague, unsubstantiated statements of an easement. Crocker is wearing the same
clothes he wore on the first day of trial, and he talks like he has a mouthful of
rocks. By the time he reaches his version of the altercation that culminated in
Dart’s death, he is down in the count.
The reality is, however, that Crocker’s story is not implausible. According
to Crocker, he approached a man urinating on what he thought to be his
property. The man responded by exclaiming, “I’ll piss and shit anywhere I
want!” Crocker retrieves a nine-millimeter handgun from his car and returns to
order the floaters to “get on down the river.” He then hears someone joke, “I
think he liked watching.” Insulted, Crocker fires shots into the gravel to
intimidate the floaters. The floaters, who outnumber Crocker at least five to
one, are not intimidated and instead arm themselves with softball-sized river
rocks. Crocker is afraid that if he turns his back, a rock will find the back of his
head. But, Crocker suffers his third strike when he claims that one rock did
find his head, causing him to fire the fatal shot inadvertently. Two sheriff’s
deputies later testify that Crocker sustained no injuries.
Nevertheless, Crocker’s belief that he owned property to the river is
genuine. The 1970 legal description of Meramec Estates establishes its
northwestern boundary at the “southeast edge of the Meramec River,” but
makes no mention of north 33 degrees, 26 minutes, 11 seconds. The Meramec
River moved in the forty years since the creation of Meramec Estates, and the
northwest property line of Lot Seven could certainly have moved with it: as
any first-year Property student knows, land gained slowly by accretion goes to
the riparian landowner.127 The State never produced evidence that the
Meramec changed course suddenly by avulsion, and Crocker would have a
strong argument that the land on which he shot Paul Dart was, in fact, his land.
However, that argument never materializes.
127. Missouri follows this rule as well. 1 MO. PRAC., METHODS OF PRAC.: TRANSACT. GUIDE
§ 15.4 (4th ed. 2011).
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After both sides rest, Seay focuses his closing argument on keeping the
castle doctrine out of the jury’s mindset. “This didn’t take place in his
castle. . . . It was not about his right to protect property. He wasn’t protecting
his home,” Seay’s voice booms. His line “[t]he defendant was on a mission” is
soaked with contempt for vigilantism. Bert makes the best argument given the
facts. “Jim stood his ground. He had no duty to retreat. Jim treated the property
as his.” When Bert asks the jurors to consider whether the jury would want
someone urinating in their yards, the hypothetical seems too far removed from
the events of July 20, 2013. Seay has already driven home for the jury that
Crocker shot Paul Dart farther than a football field away from his property.
Randazzo echoes Seay in his rebuttal: “This isn’t about rights. . . . Property
disputes shouldn’t be handled on riverbanks. They should be handled in the
courtroom.”128
With sheriff’s deputies occupying every standing space in the gallery, the
jury finds Crocker guilty of second degree murder by 4:30 p.m. After a brief
outburst of relief, Paul Dart’s family shares their emotions silently.
In a way, the Crocker trial became another abortive attempt to answer the
questions posed above, because the prosecution effectively shielded the jury
from having to grapple with the expanded castle doctrine. This is another
similarity between the Crocker case129 and its highly publicized Florida
counterparts130—neither definitively addressed the controversial expanded
self-defense laws swirling around the cases. The courtroom ignorance, willful
or otherwise, of the statutes turns them into legal ciphers: the proponent of the
expanded self-defense statute will argue that its rare application refutes the
notion that it incentivizes, or at least eliminates deterrence for, the use of
violence. The counterargument is that the self-defense statutes elicit acts of
violence with mirages of legal immunity that offer unequal protections.
Closing arguments on both sides in the Crocker case invoked the spirit of the
castle doctrine while framing it as simple self-defense. The prosecution kept
the expanded castle doctrine under wraps for obvious reasons, but the
motivation for defense approach is harder to place. Did Bert want to invoke a
justification with some familiarity for the rural jury? Was the protection
offered by defense of premises too ludicrous for the jury? Was it futile to rebut

128. Randazzo then closes with a reference to the Lone Ranger that stays with the indictment
of vigilantism, but is a bit too over the top for reproduction here. Man Gets 25 Years in Shooting
Death of Meramec River Floater, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 15, 2014), http://www.stlto
day.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/man-gets-years-in-shooting-death-of-meramec-river-floater
/article_4e9657d1-3691-529e-a05a-98c3bee421c3.html.
129. The victim’s friends acknowledged the connection even though they slightly
mischaracterized it. Id. (“There’s no stand-your-ground law in Missouri.”)
130. Alvarez, supra note 15; Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 15.
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the state’s evidence that the shooting occurred 381 yards from Crocker’s
property line?
As noted above, with the revisions to section 563.031 aimed at
undercutting Goodine,131 the legislature was essentially attempting to usurp the
authority of the judiciary and its finders of fact. Seay and Randazzo were
simply effective in keeping that authority with the jury in the Crocker case.
Because the justification of self-defense exists “to compensate for the
limitations of a written code,”132 we have historically depended on judges and
juries to evaluate self-defense claims on a case-by-case basis. This makes
perfect sense because no statutory construction can possibly contemplate every
action that may fall under its purview.133 By tinkering with the doctrine of selfdefense, the legislature undercuts not only the holding of one case but,
ultimately, the fundamental benefit of the doctrine itself.134 To put it bluntly,
our identity crisis cannot be resolved on the floor of the Missouri House of
Representatives,135 and it may never be resolved in Missouri’s circuit courts
either. However, this should never preclude public dialogue on where to limit
the justification of self-defense.136
There are some aspects of the Dart killing that should be noted regardless
of whether the expanded castle doctrine was applied. James Crocker’s
interview with Detective Zachary Driskill concluded with the following
exchange:
James stated several times in the interview that he was going to protect his
property and that, if he would have left, the people would have been gone
before law enforcement arrival. I asked James even if the people had left
wouldn’t that have been the desired result and he stated, “Yeah, that would
have worked too.” I asked James again why he did not call law enforcement
137
and he then stated he did not want to talk anymore.

Crocker was invoking that same rural notion of individualism that
underlies the justification of self-defense, but, while Saint Louis may dwarf

131. Dierker, supra note 44.
132. Robinson, supra note 17.
133. Id. at 271.
134. Namely, that a jury of twelve of the defendant’s peers could review all of the facts of a
case to determine whether a defendant’s conduct is acceptable.
135. Ideally, statutes passed by elected officials would express the will of the people, but, as
noted earlier, that is rarely the reality. See Levinson, supra note 122 (describing the lack of
representation of the people’s will in the U.S. House of Representatives).
136. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1324 (2003).
137. Felony Complaint and Request for Warrant, supra note 2.
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Steelville,138 Crocker still had access to a telephone or assistance from his
neighbors or a modern law enforcement agency. In fact, the first thing that
Crocker did after shooting Dart was knock on his neighbor’s door to request
that she call 911.139
The not-so-rural reality of the scene in Crocker’s backyard reminds us that
it is important not to conflate rural individualism with the American mythology
of the Old West or “frontier culture,”140 distilled from a stew of comic books,
TV shows, and Hollywood films that were never grounded in reality. What it
means to be rural in the twenty-first century may actually have less to do with
the stoic individualism of Gary Cooper in High Noon than the impassioned
humanitarianism of Henry Fonda in The Grapes of Wrath.141 Billboards for
tourist traps along I-44 love to boast that they were once the hideout of the
James-Younger gang,142 but, nonetheless, Steelville did not exist in a vacuum
of law and order on July 20, 2013.
There is also a tendency to accept the longevity of the justification of selfdefense, with its masculine origins,143 as an expression of something hypermasculine and inherently violent in the American character.144 The sustained
popularity of NFL football, despite its devastating impact on the players’
mental health, might attest to this aspect of our national character.145 But, we
have to recognize the difference between our history and current and future

138. The population of the city of Saint Louis is approximately thirteen times that of
Crawford County. See MO. CENSUS DATA CTR., http://census.missouri.edu/census2010/report.
php?g=05000US29510|05000US29055 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
139. Sam Levin, James Crocker: Woman Who Called 911 After Float Trip Shooting Says He
Was “Very Calm,” RIVERFRONT TIMES BLOGS (July 26, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://blogs.river
fronttimes.com/dailyrft/2013/07/james_crocker_meramec_river_shooting_911.php.
140. Epps, supra note 18.
141. These two classics of American cinema encapsulate the individualism and solidarity at
odds in modern formulations of self-defense law. Gary Cooper delivers lines like, “If you don’t
know, there’s no use in me telling you,” while Henry Fonda delivers lines like, “Wherever there’s
a fight, so hungry people can eat, I’ll be there.” High Noon (Republic Pictures 1952); Grapes of
Wrath (20th Century Fox 1940).
142. Jesse’s Hideout, JESSE JAMES WAX MUSEUM, http://www.jessejameswaxmuseum.com/
cavern_hideout.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
143. Alene Kristal, You’ve Come A Long Way, Baby: The Battered Women’s Syndrome
Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 111, 147 (1991).
144. Jamie R. Abrams, Examining Entrenched Masculinities in the Republican Government
Tradition, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 165, 207 (2011) (discussing “[t]he historical fusion of citizenship,
military service, and masculinity” in the American republican government tradition).
145. See League of Denial: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, PBS.ORG (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/league-of-denial/ (providing further discussion of NFL
football’s impact on the players).
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identity.146 The characterization of rural individualism as a relic of our nation’s
past would also explain the state of perpetual fear that proponents of expanded
self-defense seem to foster.147 When these individualists are given the sense
that they are part of an old order nearing extinction, it makes them defensive
about any newness or otherness that they might encounter. This aversion to
otherness is probably why the racially charged self-defense stories of 2013 and
2014 had such a visceral impact on Americans.
VII. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the general history of the justification of self-defense, it is
apparent that Missouri’s current law on the “use of force in defense of
persons”148 fits within both the national debate currently raging on Stand Your
Ground laws and a broader historical narrative of the American erosion of the
duty to retreat.149 The discrimination fostered by reformulations of established
self-defense doctrines, the shoddy statutory construction of those
reformulations,150 and unresolved historical conflicts embedded in the
justification of self-defense itself151 are all reasons to critically reexamine the
2007 and 2010 amendments to 563.031 and 563.011.
As of now, the terrifying events of July 20, 2013, are fortunately not
typical. However, the fear remains that we may allow antiquated
conceptualizations of justifiable homicide to define us as a nation of petty,
isolated vigilante pretenders living in a state of perpetual mistrust. If that
happens, Meramec River killings will become all too typical.
VINCENT K. HEITHOLT*

146. While it may seem a bit unacademic to throw out references to NFL football and old
Hollywood movies, the tensions over gun violence are fueled more by cultural orientation than
empirical data. Kahan & Braman, supra note 136, at 1323–24.
147. See Jamelle Bouie, Could America Become Mississippi?, SLATE (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/04/demographics_conservatism_
and_racial_polarization_could_america_become_mississippi.html (discussing certain groups’
resistance to demographic change and fear of dependency on the government).
148. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2010); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 563.011 (2010)
(providing the definitions that govern Missouri’s justification defense).
149. Lave, supra note 54, at 832–35; Epps, supra note 18, at 311–14.
150. Pohlman, supra note 23, at 881–82.
151. Pierce, supra note 115, at 417–22.
* J.D., 2015, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Marcia
McCormick for her gracious assistance in the drafting of this Note. I would also like to thank
Cierra Simpson for her unfailing support through the revision process.
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